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Abstract
We analyze an economy where principals and agents match and contract
subject to moral hazard. Bankruptcy law defines the limited liability constraint
in these contracts. We analyse Walrasian allocations to generate the following
predictions: (i) weakening bankruptcy law causes redistribution of debt and
welfare from poor agents and principals to rich agents; (ii) exemption limits
Pareto-dominate other bankruptcy laws if project size is fixed; (iii) means-
testing (as in recent US personal bankruptcy law) which is ex post pro-poor in
intent makes the poor worse off ex ante.
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1 Introduction
Bankruptcy law plays a central role in modern economies, determining access to credit
and allocation of assets. Yet, both the law and its enforcement vary widely across de-
veloped and developing countries, between developed countries, and between different
states within a given country.4 For example, personal bankruptcy law in Germany is
far less lenient compared with the US: in the former country defaulting borrowers
have to pay a significant portion of their earnings for six years after the default, while
Chapter 7 provisions in the US have traditionally allowed most borrowers to not incur
any liability against future earnings after a default. The liability of borrowers under
Chapter 7 at the time of default is limited to assets owned at that point of time, in
excess of an exemption limit. Those with fewer assets than the exemption limit do not
incur any liability at all. These exemption limits vary widely across different states
in the US (Gropp, Scholz and White (1997)).
Personal bankruptcy law affects subsequent economic fortunes of borrowers in dis-
tress, whose numbers typically exceeded 1 million filings per year in the US over the
period 1996-2014.5 While most popular arguments for weaker bankruptcy laws focus
on their ex post consequences on borrowers in distress, economists draw attention
to their adverse consequences on ex ante credit access, particularly for poor bor-
rowers. Cross-country and cross-US-state comparisons do indicate significant positive
correlation between stringency of debtor liability and ex ante credit access (e.g., see
Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) and Gropp, Scholz and White (1997)). Never-
theless, there are few theoretical analyses of the distributional incidence or optimal
design of bankruptcy law in a general equilibrium setting with contracts.
4For more details of cross-country comparisons, see Djankov, McLiesh and Shleifer (2007) and
Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2008).
5This pertains to the annual number of non-business bankruptcy filings in the US, according to the
American Bankruptcy Institute: see http://abi-org.s3.amazonaws.com/Newsroom/Bankruptcy_Statistics/
Quarterlynonbusinessfilings1994-Present.pdf.
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We study a two-sided matching model of debt or asset lease contracts subject
to moral hazard, where liability limits are defined by bankruptcy law. This is used
to analyze general equilibrium and welfare effects of changing the law. The model
is characterized by two-sided heterogeneity: agents (borrowers or tenants) differ in
wealth, and principals (lenders or asset owners) have limited capacities to lend or
contract, and may have differing overhead or monitoring costs. Capacity constraints
of principals effectively creates an ‘upward sloping supply curve’, which generates
general equilibrium (GE) effects of changes in bankruptcy law via their effects on
lender profits and interest rates. Borrowers of heterogeneous wealth coexist, and the
GE effects on interest rates end up generating pecuniary externalities across them.
Our principal focus is on how these distributive effects modify conventional wisdom
based on partial equilibrium reasoning.
In our model, the number of projects that a given agent can operate can vary,
but is subject to diminishing returns. Principal-agent coalitions form ex ante and
design financial contracts determining contributions to the project financing upfront,
followed by ex post state-contingent transfers subject to legal liability limits. The total
supply of credit (i.e., entry of principals), its allocation and pricing across different
borrowers are endogenously determined.6
We show that raising borrower exemptions stipulated in bankruptcy law induce re-
allocation of credit (resp. assets and payoffs) across borrowers of heterogenous wealth:
lending to poorer agents shrink, while they expand for the richest agents. At the same
time, the (default adjusted) cost of borrowing decreases. The redistribution of credit
matches the cross-US-state empirical patterns identified by Gropp et al (1997) or
Cerqueiro and Penas (2014). Absent any GE effects, default adjusted profit rates
6The different ingredients of the model are necessary to derive different parts of our main results.
Varying project scale is relevant for understanding the redistribution of credit across borrowers. The
moral hazard part is crucial for showing that exemption limits are Pareto optimal. Only heterogeneity
on the side of the principals is not strictly necessary and could be replaced by the simplifying
assumption of fixed supply -this generates the strongest form of GE effects.
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are fixed and interest rates must increase as is shown in Gropp et al. (1997). In our
model, interest rates need not increase due to higher exemption limits. Owing to
general equilibrium effects, interest rates may decrease or remain constant since an
increase in exemption limits will lead to a decrease in the profit rate. This makes the
findings in our paper consistent with the puzzling effects found in Gropp et al (1997):
rich borrowers are able to borrow more in high exemption limit states without having
to pay higher interest rates.
Our theory explains these as the result of interplay between two opposing effects:
(i) a partial equilibrium (PE) effect of weakening agent liability which restricts the
set of feasible contracts by making it more difficult for borrowers (resp. tenants) to
commit credibly to repaying their loans (resp. paying their rent), and (ii) a general
equilibrium (GE) effect of a lowering of profit rates. The intensity of the adverse PE
effect is greater for poorer agents, and non-existent for rich agents, as the latter do
not face problems with credible payment on account of possessing sufficient assets to
post collateral. On the other hand, the GE effect benefits all agents uniformly. Hence
the richest agents benefit from a weakening of bankruptcy law, while the poor face
greater difficulty in gaining access to the market.
Apart from explaining cross-US-state patterns, our theory generates the following
normative implications. First, stronger bankruptcy laws or measures to protect lender
rights are not ex ante Pareto-improving in general, as might appear from a purely
partial equilibrium perspective. They hurt richer agents owing to the GE effect, while
benefiting lenders (via higher profits) and poorer agents (owing to enhanced market
access, due to the PE effect). Second, we show that exemption limits – where all assets
above the limit (and none below) are appropriable by lenders — are an optimal form
of bankruptcy law in the case where project scales are not variable (e.g., owing to
strong diminishing returns).7 These results provide a normative basis for exemption
7In the case of a fixed project scale, weakening bankruptcy law causes agent efforts to fall or
remain unchanged, implying that aggregate welfare in the economy cannot improve. In the more
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limit-based laws, and potential political-economy explanations for wide variations
observed in bankruptcy law across states and countries. They predict that wealthy
borrowers will demand weaker bankruptcy laws, while lenders (and poor borrowers,
if they are politically organized) will demand stronger ones. The relative number and
political influence of these different interest groups in a given society will affect the
actual law and its enforcement. Finally, our analysis predicts that the means test of
the 2005 BAPCPA reform of US bankruptcy law will have adverse effects on poor
borrowers from an ex ante perspective, even though the law appears to be designed
to protect such borrowers.
Our paper also makes a methodological contribution by providing a new and
simple way of analyzing markets where principals and agents match and enter into
contracts. The typical approach in the literature to modeling the effects of bankruptcy
law on a competitive credit market is to use a Walrasian approach, with the interest
rate as the ‘price’ (e.g., see Gropp et al (1997)). One problem with this approach
is that both the supply and demand for credit depend on the default rate, which is
endogenously determined. Changes in the law which induce changes in default then
cause both the supply and demand curves to shift, which obscures comparative static
effects on equilibrium allocations. The microfoundations of this approach are also not
clear; neither is it obvious how to integrate credit rationing into it.
We use an alternative way of modeling outcomes in the market for credit contracts
which overcomes these problems: as a Walrasian allocation with a different notion of
‘price’ which is taken as given by all market participants: the per unit (default-risk-
adjusted) expected return on loans received by lenders. The demand curve is obtained
by solving for an optimal contract from the standpoint of each borrower, subject to
incentive constraints for the borrower, and a participation constraint for each lender
that they attain at least the going rate of return on monies lent. This problem can
be solved using tools of conventional contract theory, and incorporates credit limits
general case, we cannot sign the effect on aggregate welfare.
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that may be imposed on the borrower for incentive reasons, as well as the attendant
default risks. The market demand curve is obtained by aggregating the individual
demand curves across all borrowers, and the equilibrium rate of return is obtained by
equating supply and demand. In this formulation, the supply curve is unaffected by
default rates and hence by the law. The latter only affects the demand in ways that
can be obtained by application of standard contract theoretic techniques.
Besides generating strong predictions that are easy to understand and interpret,
this approach can be provided a secure microfoundation: we show that the set of
Walrasian allocations as defined above is equivalent to the set of stable allocations
(in the sense of Gale and Shapley (1962) or Roth and Sotomayor (1990)) in the
two-sided matching game with lenders and borrowers. This provides a new way of
extending conventional partial equilibrium contract theory to a general equilibrium
setting.
As Section 2 elaborates, our explanation for why bankruptcy laws are often weak
or poorly enforced is in contrast to others based on incomplete contracting, limited
rationality or foresight of borrowers (including scope for manipulation or fraud by
lenders), preoccupation of contract enforcers with ex post relief for borrowers in dis-
tress to the exclusion of their ex ante effects on credit access. Our theory applies
in the most conventional setting employed by economists: a world of complete con-
tracts, perfect rationality, with ex ante welfare judgments. Moreover, it does not rely
on effects of bankruptcy law on insurance provided to borrowers, as all agents in our
model are assumed to be risk-neutral.
The paper is organized as follows. A detailed description of related literature is
provided in Section 2. The model is set up in section 3. In section 4 we solve the model,
provide a microeconomic foundation for the use of our Walrasian equilibrium concept,
and state our main result. Section 5 discusses the simpler case of fixed project size in
more detail: we show that exemption limit laws Pareto dominate other bankruptcy
laws in this setting. The effects of the new bankruptcy law introduced by BAPCPA
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in 2005 is discussed in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Supporting Empirical Papers
There are two closely related empirical papers which test our theory. A direct test
of the impact of exemption limits on small entrepreneurs in the US is provided in
Cerqueiro and Penas (2014).8 They focus on small businesses covered in the Kauffman
Firm Survey for whom personal bankruptcy law applies. In their empirical specifica-
tion, they run difference-of-differences regressions using the staggered state-by-state
changes of exemption limits across US states. They show that an increase in exemp-
tion limits had a negative impact on low wealth entrepreneurs and a positive impact
on high wealth entrepreneurs. These findings are motivated by and consistent with
our theory.
Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee, and Visaria (2012) base a model of firm bankruptcy
on the theoretical framework in this paper, which allows for difference in speed in
bankruptcy decisions by the court. They analyze debt recovery tribunals (DRTs)
implemented in India which reduced delays in debt recovery suits for firms with large
debts. Our analysis implies that with an upward sloping supply of capital, the reform
would raise interest rates and reallocate credit from small to large firms. They verified
these predictions empirically, utilizing the staggered introduction of these DRTs across
different Indian states with a difference-of-difference specification.
A key assumption in our analysis is the existence of capacity constraints for prin-
8The recent empirical literature on the importance of exemption limits is exemplified by Mahoney
(2015). Mahoney (2015) looks at the impact of Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings on demand for health
insurance, showing that soft bankruptcy law will serve as a substitute for private health insurance.
Dobbie and Song (2015), on the other hand, look at the ex post impact of bankruptcy protection
while we focus on ex ante effects.
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cipals, which give rise to the GE effects of bankruptcy law on equilibrium profit rates.
We believe this is a reasonable assumption even with globalized financial markets.
The critical feature needed is the existence of some scarce local input required for
agents to succeed. This input can be the fixed supply of assets (land, housing, taxi
cab licences, or franchise outlets), or limited monitoring capacity of local financial
intermediaries. Existing evidence for the US is consistent with this hypothesis: for
example, Black and Strahan (2002), Cetorelli and Strahan (2004), and Petersen and
Rajan (1995) show that local credit market conditions affect firms’ access to credit
and entry of young firms. Lilienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee and Visaria (2012) also provide
evidence that Indian banks reallocated loan officers and bank branches away from ru-
ral areas serving mainly small borrowers to urban areas serving large firms following
the DRT reform.
2.2 Theoretical Analyses
Many arguments for weak bankruptcy laws in existing literature rest on their role in
providing insurance, a feature we abstract from. The underlying assumption in such
literature is that contracts are incomplete (e.g., Gropp, Scholz and White (1997),
Bolton and Rosenthal (2002), Fan and White (2003)). An analogous point is made
in the literature on general equilibrium with incomplete markets (see Zame (1993)
or Perri (2008)). Uninsurable income shocks also play an important role in dy-
namic macroeconomic models calibrated to US data studying effects of changes in
bankruptcy law (Athreya (2002), Livshits, MacGee and Tertilt (2007) and Chatterjee
et al. (2007)). These papers focus on GE effects operating through different channels.
For instance, Athreya (2002) focuses on effects of stronger bankruptcy laws in low-
ering interest rates on borrowing owing to a decline in default rates, which in turn
increase interest rates on saving in order to generate required loanable funds. This
induces a rise in household savings which generate welfare benefits via self-insurance.
Li and Sarte (2006) obtain opposite results in a model where lower borrowing in-
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terest rates (resulting from stronger bankruptcy laws) increase household borrowing,
crowding out funds for firm investment which lowers output and welfare. They also
argue that reforms such as the 2005 BAPCPA could also have similar effects owing to
increased incidence of Chapter 13 filings which act as an effective tax on labor supply.
Mitman (2015) examines negative interactions between bankruptcy and foreclosure
arising from household substitution between unsecured and secured credit, owing to
a decline in interest rates on unsecured credit that results from stronger bankruptcy
laws. Our analysis abstracts from these channels of impact (insurance, production or
housing foreclosure), being concerned mainly about distributional effects of changes
in bankruptcy law rather than output or efficiency impacts.
Besley, Burchardi and Ghatak (2012) focus on GE effects in a theoretical model
of credit contracts with moral hazard, limited liability and two-sided heterogeneity
similar to ours. Rather than looking at bankruptcy law, they investigate the impact
of changing collateralizability of assets owned by borrowers. Changing bankruptcy
provisions and collateralizability are similar in some respects, by changing the ability
of lenders to seize borrower assets in the event of default. Hence some of our results
overlap, e.g., the observation that the distribution of benefits between borrowers and
lenders depend on who is on the short side of the market. However our analyses differ
on many other dimensions. Our main focus is on the distribution of benefits across
borrowers of heterogenous wealth, an issue ignored by their model (which abstracts
from lender capacity constraints). Moreover, our paper addresses issues specific to
the bankruptcy setting, such as the optimal design of bankruptcy penalties, and
distributive effects of exemption limits or means-testing.
A related paper of ours (von Lilienfeld-Toal and Mookherjee (2010)) uses a sim-
ilar approach to this paper to examine laws pertaining to bonded labor provisions,
wherein future labor income can be used as collateral. While banned in most coun-
tries, such bans are not well enforced in many poor countries. That paper proposes an
explanation of why more developed countries tend to ban (or enforce) bonded labor
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contracts.
Manove, Padilla and Pagano (2001) provide a novel argument for weak bankruptcy
law, in terms of the need to provide banks with incentives to screen investment
projects. They show that in a competitive credit market, equilibrium loan contracts
will be designed with excessively high collateral requirements that leave lenders with
insufficient incentives to screen projects. Legal restrictions on collateral mitigate this
inefficiency. If the credit market were more monopolistic, this inefficiency also tends to
be mitigated as lenders internalize the effects of superior project quality. Our theory
in contrast implies that the contracting externality across borrowers owing to the GE
effect is magnified when the credit market is less competitive.
Our focus on the distributional impact of the law is shared by a number of recent
theoretical papers on the political economy of law and finance. A political process de-
termines investor protection, employment protection or nature of bank regulation in a
number of papers (Perotti and von Thadden (2005), Pagano and Volpin (2005), Per-
otti and Volpin (2012), Aney, Ghatak, and Morelli (2015)). The most closely related
paper is Biais and Mariotti (2009), who consider defaulting firms and their access
to credit when corporate bankruptcy law regulating liquidation of firms is changed.
All these papers focus on general equilibrium spillovers from the credit market to
the labor market, while our focus is on general equilibrium effects within the credit
market and in particular the effects on redistribution across borrowers of heteroge-
neous wealth. Moreover, we focus on issues specific to personal rather than corporate
bankruptcy law.9
9Nevertheless, our predictions of the distributional effects of softening bankruptcy law with re-
spect to rents are similar in some respects, though operating via different channels. In Biais and
Mariotti (2009) for instance, softer laws benefit wealthier investors as they cause entry of less wealthy
investors to fall, which causes the wage rate to fall. At the same time, their model has no impli-
cations with respect to redistribution of credit. In our context wealthy entrepreneurs benefit from
softer laws owing to reduced competition for funds arising from less wealthy entrepreneurs and this
is also mirrored in better access to credit. Therefore both theories predict wealthy borrowers will
10
Finally, other papers studying stable allocations in matching markets with con-
tracts include Dam and Perez-Castrillo (2006), Besley and Ghatak (2005) and Legros
and Newman (2007). Methodologically our result concerning equivalence of stable
allocations and Walrasian allocations of contracting equilibrium models may be of
some independent interest, as it provides a convenient and simple method for deriv-
ing comparative static effects of parametric changes.
3 Model
3.1 Technology, Endowments
The economy has a population of m ≥ 2 principals denoted j = 1, . . . ,m and n agents
denoted i = 1, . . . , n. Each principal owns an asset such as a plot of land, equipment
(real estate, taxicabs) or franchise that requires the effort of an agent to generate
income, in combination with working capital funded either from the agent’s wealth,
or loans provided by the principal. Agents are prospective tenants who do not own
the asset themselves; principals are asset owners who are unable to provide the labor
necessary to generate income from these assets. Agents are wealth-constrained. They
are ordered in terms of their ex ante wealth: w1 ≥ w2 ≥ w3 . . .; the wealth distribution
is given. Some results in the paper are nonvacuous only if the wealth upper bound
w1 of borrowers is sufficiently large.
10 Principals are not wealth-constrained.
Each agent can work at a scale of γ = 1, 2, . . ., which represents the number of
assets leased and operated. For instance, a tenant farmer may lease multiple plots of
land. An entrepreneur may start a project at one of many different scales. There are
diminishing returns to project scale, described in more detail below.
prefer soft bankruptcy laws, unlike lenders and less-wealthy borrowers.
10For instance, our main result (Proposition 8 below) concerning redistributional effects of chang-
ing bankruptcy law, requires existence of borrowers wealthy enough that they attain first-best project
scales.
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A key assumption of the model is the existence of capacity limits on principals. We
consider the extreme case where each principal owns a single unit of the relevant asset.
Principal j is subject to a fixed (overhead or monitoring) cost of fj: its net profit is
its operating profit (defined by net transfers, as explained below) less this fixed cost.
The results extend straightforwardly to a wider class of asset distributions across
principals. Specifically, if a principal owns q ≥ 2 assets and is subject to overhead
cost of r per asset, the same results obtain if there are at least q other principals
owning one asset each with a overhead cost of r. The existence of such a ‘competitive
fringe’ of small asset owners will eliminate any possible monopoly power of large asset
owners. Our results extend to contexts where the supply side is competitive in this
particular sense.
The model also applies to a pure credit context, where entrepreneurs or borrowers
do not need to lease assets from principals, and only need to borrow funds from the
latter. In such a case the agents own or have free access to all other assets required
to execute the project. In the simple version we exposit below, each principal has
the capacity to lend enough to finance a single project at unit scale; the analysis
applies with more general distributions of loanable funds among lenders satisfying an
analogous ‘competitive fringe’ property.11
An agent leasing γ assets will form a coalition with γ principals. In order to operate
each asset, an upfront (working capital or investment) cost of I has to be incurred, so
the total upfront financing need is γ · I, which must be distributed between the agent
and the principals in the coalition.12 If the agent leases γ assets, we say that the project
11One complication in the pure credit context arises if σ(w) ≡ 0 for all w. In that case borrowers
wealthy enough to achieve the first-best will be able to entirely self-finance their projects, and will
thus not need to borrow. Then Proposition 8 concerning redistributive effects of altering bankruptcy
law may become vacuous. However, if ex post incomes are positive, this would no longer be true:
there can be wealthy borrowers who achieve the first-best and yet would want to borrow (against
their future incomes).
12We ignore the possibility of outside financing on the grounds of the benefits of ‘interlinked’
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scale is γ. The agent subsequently selects effort e ∈ [0, 1], whence the project results in
a success with probability e, and failure otherwise. If successful (outcome s), the return
is γβys; if failure (outcome f), it is γ
βyf , where ys > I > yf and β ∈ (0, 1) represents
the extent of diminishing returns with respect to scale. Effort e entails a nonpecuniary
cost of D(e) for the agent, where D(0) = 0, D′(e) > 0, D′′(e) > 0, D′′′(e) > 0 for all
e > 0. The assumption ys > I > yf ensures the income from the project will be
negative if unsuccessful, and positive if successful. In addition, we assume there exists
e ∈ (0, 1) such that e(ys − yf ) + yf > I +D(e), i.e., at unit scale the project returns
an expected net income in excess of the effort cost of the agent. Without such an
assumption the technology does not allow any agent to be viable at any scale, even
in a first-best setting.
3.2 Contracts and Default
An agent with ex ante wealth wi can contribute all or part of it (d ≤ wi) towards the
upfront financing cost γ · I, borrowing the remainder from the principals in the coali-
tion (denoted Ci). They design the contract defining contributions of each member of
the coalition towards the upfront cost (d for the agent, Ij for each principal j ∈ Ci)
and mandated financial transfers tkj from the agent to each principal j ∈ Ci after
the project is completed, conditional on the outcome (k = s, f). After the project is
completed, the agent obtains the return (γβyk in state k) from the project, in addition
to an exogenously determined income σ(w) from other sources.13 We assume σ(.) is
a strictly increasing function. The ex post wealth of the agent will be the sum of: (a)
contracts (see Braverman and Stiglitz 1982): any financial contract offered by outsiders can be
replicated by insiders as the latter are not wealth-constrained, with the benefit that common-agency
externalities can be avoided.
13Much of our analysis can be extended to a setting where ex post income is stochastic, but
positively correlated with initial wealth. This income could either be due to some illiquid wealth
invested in other productive activities. Alternatively, it could constitute labor income earned on a
spot labor market.
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w−d, portion of ex ante wealth remaining after the upfront contribution; (b) project
return γβyk in state k, and (iii) outside income σ(w). From this wealth, the agent de-
cides what transfers to make to each principal, and consumes the rest. Consumption
must be nonnegative; hence physical feasibility requires aggregate transfers made to
not exceed the ex post wealth of the agent.
Default occurs following outcome k if the agent fails to make the required transfer
tkj to some principal j ∈ Ci. Liability rules then specify a penalty of p(W ) to be
incurred by the agent, where W denotes the agent’s ex post wealth net of project
returns at the point of default. In the event of default, the project returns accrue to
the principals in Ci: principal j is entitled to skj where
∑
j∈Ci skj = γ
βyk. Feasibil-
ity dictates that W ≥ p(W ). We also assume that p(W ) and W − p(W ) are both
nondecreasing in W . The former assumption seems natural: increases in the capacity
of contract enforcers to impose punishments should not result in lower punishments.
The latter assumption is also a natural consequence of agents having the option of
destroying their own wealth.
We assume that p(W ) either accrues to the government or outside parties, or rep-
resents pure social deadweight losses (e.g., court or lawyer fees, costs of imprisonment
or other penalties). Part of these could also represent mandated punitive transfers to
the principals in the coalition. The exact destination of p(W ) will make no difference,
as default will not actually occur in equilibrium.
In the event that the project outcome is k ∈ {s, f} and the agent does not default,
the agent’s net payoff will be
wi + σ(wi)− d−
∑
j∈Ci
tkj + γ
βyk −D(e) (1)
and of principal j ∈ Ci will be
tkj − Ij − fj. (2)
And if the agent defaults, the agent will earn
wi + σ(wi)− d− p(wi + σ(wi)− d)−D(e) (3)
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and principal j will earn
skj − Ij − fj. (4)
It follows that default occurs if and only if (assuming the agent does not default
unless strictly advantageous):∑
j∈Ci
tkj > γ
βyk + p(wi + σ(wi)− d) (5)
Once outcome k is realized, the agent and the principals in the coalition can
renegotiate the contractual payments tkj provided they are all better off from that
point onwards.
The exact sequence of events thus is as follows: (1) each agent is matched with
a coalition of principals; (2) contracts are written; (3) the agent selects effort e; (4)
outcome k is realized; (5) mandated transfers are renegotiated if there is scope for an
ex post Pareto improvement; (6) the agent decides whether or not to default, following
which payoffs are realized.
Lemma 1 Given any coalition Ci of principals associated with agent i, without loss
of generality, attention can be restricted to contracts in which:
(i) there is no default in equilibrium, i.e., (5) does not hold;
(ii) d = wi, i.e., the agent contributes his entire ex ante wealth as downpayment;
(iii) principal j acquires a constant share δj of the project, in the sense that she
contributes Ij = δj(γ · I − wi) upfront and receives transfer tkj = δj
∑
l∈Ci tkl.
The proof of this and many subsequent results are relegated to the Appendix. The
underlying idea is simple. Default does not arise in equilibrium, since any contract
inducing default generates deadweight losses which can be avoided via an ex post
Pareto improving renegotiation. Hence attention can be restricted to contracts that do
not provide borrowers with an incentive to default ex post. This imposes an incentive
15
compatibility restriction on the agent’s default incentive, apart from the conventional
incentive constraint associated with ex ante effort choice. The no-default constraint
is defined by the level of transfers that the bankruptcy law would allow ex post; a
weaker bankruptcy law would lower such transfers, thus restricting the set of feasible
default-free contracts. Increasing downpayments made by the borrower helps relax
these constraints, since these reduce ex post wealth of the borrower by more than they
increase ex post transfers in the event of default. Finally, risk-neutrality of principals
implies that they care only about their expected net returns. Hence we do not have
take any risk sharing considerations across principals into account. Rather, we can
view principals as if they pool payments to finance project and pool the payments
received from the agent. Each principal then finances a share of the project ex-ante
and receives the same fraction of the payments ex-post.
In what follows we restrict attention to contracts depicted in the above Lemma.
It helps to denote contracts in terms of wealth vk of the agent following outcome k:
vk ≡ γβyk + σ(wi)− Tk (6)
where Tk ≡
∑
j∈Ci tkj denotes the aggregate transfer paid by the agent in state k.
The agent’s net payoff in state k following effort choice e is vk −D(e), and expected
payoff is evs + (1 − e)vf − D(e). Denoting aggregate (expected) operating profit of
the principals by
Π ≡ eTs + (1− e)Tf − [γ · I − wi], (7)
the expected payoff of principal j ∈ Ci is δjΠ − fj. The contract can then be
represented by the aggregate financial transfers and shares of different principals:
(Ts, Tf , {δj}j∈Ci), besides project scale γ and effort e. Equivalently we can represent
it in terms of (vs, vf , {δj}j∈Ci , γ, e), using (6). The no-default condition in state k
requires
Tk ≤ γβ · yk + p(σ(wi)) (8)
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which reduces to
σ(wi) ≤ vk + p(σ(wi)). (9)
The contract (vs, vf , {δj}j∈Ci , γ, e) with shares δj ≥ 0,
∑
j∈Ci δj = 1 is feasible if
it satisfies the following constraints:
vs − vf = D′(e) (IC)
vk ≥ σ(wi)− p(σ(wi)), k = s, f (LL)
Π ≡ γβ[eys + (1− e)yf ]− [evs + (1− e)vf ] + σ(wi) + wi − γ · I ≥
∑
j∈Ci
fj (PCP )
evs + (1− e)vf −D(e) ≥ wi + σ(wi) (PCA)
Here (IC) refers to the effort incentive constraint, (LL) to the no-default constraint,
and (PCA) to the participation constraint for the agent. The constraint (PCP) is
clearly necessary for each principal to break even. It is also sufficient in the sense that
one can find shares δj, j ∈ Ci such that j breaks even in expectation (i.e., δj ·Π ≥ fj).
Accordingly we can simplify the definition of a contract to a tuple (vs, vf , γ ≥ 1, e),
and call it feasible for coalition Ci of principals if it satisfies (IC), (LL), (PCP) and
(PCA). We can then call an agent with wealth wi viable if the set of feasible contracts
is nonempty for that agent, for some coalition Ci of principals.
Note the role of bankruptcy law, in its stipulation of default penalties imposed
on the agent: these define the limit of the agent’s liability, as represented by (LL). A
stronger bankruptcy law pertains to a penalty function p˜(.) which uniformly domi-
nates another p(.), i.e., if p˜(W ) ≥ p(W ) for all W . An example of a specific bankruptcy
law is one involving an exemption limit E, with a zero marginal tax rate below the
limit and 100% above the limit: p(W ;E) = max{0,W −E}. A lower exemption limit
then corresponds to a strengthening of bankruptcy law, and a corresponding weak-
ening of the (LL) constraint. This enlarges the set of feasible contracts for any given
agent.
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It is easy to check that viability of agents is positively related to their wealth.
Intuitively, this occurs because wealthier agents require less external finance, and
thus need to repay less to the lenders: this effect outweighs the higher payoff option
available to them if they default.14
Lemma 2 Suppose agent i with wealth wi is viable. Then every agent l with wl > wi
is also viable.
4 Stable Allocations
An allocation is a matching of each agent i = 1, . . . , n with a coalition Ci of principals
such that Ci
⋂
Cl = ∅ when i 6= l, and a contract for each matched agent i which is
feasible for the coalition Ci. An agent i is unmatched if Ci = ∅: such an agent gets
payoff wi +σ(wi). A principal j is unmatched if j does not belong to Ci for any agent
i. Such a principal earns a payoff of 0. Payoffs for matched agents and principals are
defined by the contracts they enter into.
A common solution concept for matching models is the set of stable allocations
(Gale and Shapley (1962), Roth and Sotomayor (1990)). This is defined as follows.
An allocation is said to be stable if there does not exist any agent i and a coalition
Cˆi of principals that can enter into a feasible contract with i which generates a higher
payoff for i and every principal in Cˆi.
A characterization of stable allocations will turn out to greatly simplify our anal-
ysis, besides being a result of some independent methodological interest as it could
be fruitfully applied in the analysis of contracts in many other matching contexts. We
shall show below that the set of stable allocations coincides with a particular notion
of Walrasian allocations. To introduce this concept, we will be thinking of the market
for contracts for leasing one unit of the asset, with the ‘price’ pi of such contracts
14This relies on the assumption that the slope of p(.) is less than one.
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represented by the rate of operating profit per asset leased. Principals and agents
take this profit rate as given: each principal decides whether to enter the market and
offer her asset for lease. Each agent decides on how many assets to lease, and designs
a contract to maximize her own utility, subject to the constraint of generating a profit
of at least pi for each asset she leases.
The Walrasian demand for contracts by an agent i corresponds to the solution of
the following problem, given the profit rate pi: select contract (vs, vf , e, γ) to maximize
expected payoff evs+(1−e)vf −D(e) subject to (IC), (LL), (PCA) and the following
‘budget constraint’:
γβ[eys + (1− e)yf ]− [evs + (1− e)vf ] + wi + σ(wi) ≥ γ · (I + pi). (BC)
If the feasible contract set is empty, set γ = 0. We shall call any solution to this
problem as an A-optimal contract for agent i, given profit rate pi per asset leased.
A Walrasian allocation is defined to be an allocation and an operating profit rate
pi per asset such that:
(a) for any agent i, the contract (vis, v
i
f , e
i, γi) assigned to agent i is A-optimal for i
relative to pi.
(b) the ‘supply’ of assets (or number of active principals) is determined as follows:
any principal with fj > pi is inactive; any principal with fj < pi is active. Every
active principal receives the same expected operating profit pi.
(c) the total demand for assets
∑
i γ
i equals the supply. Agent i is assigned a coali-
tion Ci consisting of γ
i principals, arbitrarily selected from the set of active
principals.
We now provide the main result linking stable and Walrasian allocations.
Proposition 3 An allocation is stable if and only if it is Walrasian.
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The intuitive reasoning underlying this result is as follows. Owing to competition
among lenders, they must all attain the same rate of operating profit per unit leased.
Any principal that can cover its fixed costs with the common rate of operating profit
will be willing to enter, others will not be willing to enter. Hence supply decisions
are as if lenders take the rate of operating profit as given and decide on their profit-
maximizing responses. Moreover, every borrower must select an optimal contract,
subject to the ‘budget’ constraint of paying the going expected rate of return to all
its lenders (apart from effort and no-default incentive constraints). Otherwise it is
possible to find a Pareto-improving coalition: a contract can be designed to provide
the borrower with higher expected utility, and its lenders a higher rate of profit. In
this sense, the demand for projects is also Walrasian. Finally, matching implies that
supply and demand are balanced.
This result allows us to focus on Walrasian allocations for the rest of our analysis.
Since the supply side of the market is simple, we need to understand how A-optimal
demands for project scale for borrowers of differing wealths are affected. We turn to
this next.
4.1 A-Optimal Contracts
The A-optimal problem for an agent with wealth w can be represented more simply
as follows. Using (IC) to substitute for vs in terms of vf and e, the problem is to
choose (vf , e, γ) to maximize
vf + eD
′(e)−D(e)
subject to
γβR(e)− eD′(e)− γ · (I + pi) + σ(w) + w ≥ vf ≥ σ(w)− p(σ(w))
where R(e) ≡ eys + (1 − e)yf , the first constraint is the budget constraint, and the
second constraint is (LL). The feasible set in this problem is non-empty if there exists
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(e, γ) such that
γβR(e)− eD′(e)− γ · (I + pi) ≥ −w − p(σ(w)) (F )
If the feasible set is empty we can set γ = e = 0. Otherwise, for any (e, γ) satisfying
(F), it is optimal to set
vf = γ
βR(e)− eD′(e)− γ · (I + pi) + w + σ(w)
so we can restate the A-optimal problem as selection of (e, γ) to maximize
{γβR(e)−D(e)− γ · (I + pi)}+ w + σ(w) (AO)
subject to constraint (F).
Denote the solution to the A-optimal problem (AO) by γ(pi,w), e(pi,w), with the
convention that γ(pi,w) = e = 0 if the maximized value of (AO) falls below the
autarkic payoff of w + σ(w). And denote the corresponding problem of maximiz-
ing (AO) without any constraints the first-best problem, with solution γ∗(pi), e∗(pi).
Note that the discreteness of project scale implies that the optimal contract may be
non-unique in either first-best or second-best situations; hence (γ(pi,w), e(pi,w)) and
(γ∗(pi), e∗(pi)) are correspondences.
Note also that the first-best generates positive surplus to the agent (i.e., above
the autarkic payoff of w + σ(w)) if pi = 0, since there exists e (with γ = 1) such that
R(e)−D(e) > I. On the other hand for pi sufficiently large, a positive surplus cannot
be generated. This will impose an upper bound p¯i to the profit rate pi consistent with
a positive demand for projects from the agent.
Lemma 4 (a) For any given profit rate pi ≥ 0, there exists w¯(pi), a nondecreasing
function of pi, such that every A-optimal contract for an agent with wealth w
above w¯(pi) is first-best: (γ(pi,w), e(pi,w)) = (γ∗(pi), e∗(pi)). Conversely, w <
w¯(pi) implies that the first-best cannot be attained.
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(b) The first-best contract (γ∗(pi), e∗(pi)) is nonincreasing in pi, in the sense that
pi2 > pi1 implies that γ2 ≤ γ1 and e2 ≤ e1 for any first-best choice (γm, em) ∈
(γ∗(pim), e∗(pim)),m = 1, 2.
(c) If w < w¯(pi), every A-optimal contract involves lower effort than the first-best
(e(pi,w) < e∗(pi)), and γ(pi,w) ≤ γ∗(pi).
This Lemma states that for agents with wealth above some threshold, A-optimal
contracts will be first-best. For the first-best contract which is an unconstrained max-
imizer of (AO) is independent of the wealth of the agent, and it satisfies constraint
(F) if this wealth is sufficiently high. As the required profit rate to be paid increases,
it reduces the desired project scale, and in turn this reduces the borrower’s ex ante
effort. For those borrowers not wealthy enough to be able to implement the first-best
contract, the scale of the project has to be reduced in order to meet constraint (F).
While these results appear reasonable enough, proving them is somewhat complicated
because the problem of selecting an A-optimal contract is not a convex optimization
problem (owing to the complementarity between project scale and effort).
The next set of results show that A-optimal demand for project scale is nonde-
creasing in the agent’s wealth, and nonincreasing in the going profit rate.
Lemma 5 If w1 < w2 < w¯(pi) then e(pi,w1) ≤ e(pi,w2) and γ(pi,w1) ≤ γ(pi,w2) for
any selection of A-optimal contracts.
Lemma 6 If pi1 < pi2 then e(pi1, w) ≥ e(pi2, w) and γ(pi1, w) ≥ γ(pi2, w) for any
selection of A-optimal contracts.
Moreover, weakening bankruptcy law tightens the no-default constraint, which in
turn reduces A-optimal demand for project scale.
Lemma 7 Consider a weakening of bankruptcy rules from p2(.) to p1(.) in the sense
that p1(W ) ≤ p2(W ) for all W . Consider any (pi,w) and let γl denote the A-optimal
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project scale under rule pl, l = 1, 2. Then if the A-optimal payoff differs under the two
rules, γ1 ≤ γ2.
4.2 Distributional impact of changing bankruptcy law
These results enable us to derive our central result.
Proposition 8 Consider a weakening of bankruptcy rule from p2(.) to p1(.) (in the
sense that p2(W ) ≥ p1(W ) for all W ). Let Ai denote a Walrasian allocation result-
ing under rule pi(.), and pii the corresponding profit rate. Suppose that A2 is not a
Walrasian allocation under rule p1, in the following sense: there does not exist a Wal-
rasian allocation at p1 with the same total number of assets leased and the same profit
rate as in A2.
Then:
(a) the profit rate is lower with the weaker rule: pi1 ≤ pi2;
(b) for agents with w > w¯(pi2; p1), project scale γ, effort e and payoff are higher (or
remain the same) in A1, the Walrasian allocation corresponding to the weaker
rule p1;
(c) that total number of assets leased by agents with w < w¯(pi2; p1) is (weakly) lower
in A1.
Proof of Proposition 8: Let S2 be the total number of assets leased in the Wal-
rasian allocation under p2. By hypothesis, when the rule is changed to p1, there is
no Walrasian allocation with S2 projects leased and the same profit rate pi2. In other
words, we cannot find A-optimal project scales γ(pi2, wi, p1) under rule p1 such that∑
i γ(pi2, wi, p1) = S2. But there were A-optimal project scales γ(pi2, wi, p2) under
rule p2 such that
∑
i γ(pi2, wi, p2) = S2. By Lemma 7 we know that γ(pi2, wi, p1) ≤
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γ(pi2, wi, p2). So it must be the case that
∑
i γ(pi2, wi, p1) < S2 for any set of A-optimal
project choices at p1.
Suppose pi1 > pi2. Then any principal that was active under p2 will continue to be
active under p1. Hence the supply of assets under p1 cannot be smaller than under
p2: S1 ≥ S2. On the other hand, Lemma 6 ensures that γ(pi1, wi, p1) ≤ γ(pi2, wi, p1).
This implies S1 >
∑
i γ(pi1, wi, p1), i.e., there cannot be a Walrasian allocation at pi1
under p1. Therefore pi1 ≤ pi2, establishing (a).
Wealthy agents with w > w¯(pi2, p1) will achieve the first-best in both allocations.
Since pi1 ≤ pi2, they are (weakly) better off, and strictly better off if the profit rate
falls. By Lemma 4 their A-optimal project scale and effort will increase or remain the
same.
The total supply of assets cannot increase because pi1 ≤ pi2. Therefore the total
number of assets leased by agents with wealth below w¯(pi2, p1) cannot increase.
The intuitive reasoning is as follows. A weaker bankruptcy rule lowers the demand
for projects from poorer agents that cannot achieve the first-best, and leaves the
demand of wealthier agents unchanged. This reduces the total demand for assets,
creating an excess supply, which lowers the profit rate. This in turn increases the
demand from wealthy agents, and raises their payoffs. The reduction in the profit
rate restricts supply of assets. Hence there is a reallocation of assets from poorer to
wealthier agents. The poorer the agent, the more important is the (LL) constraint,
so they tend to be the most adversely impacted by the weakening of the bankruptcy
rule. Some of them may be excluded from the market altogether.
Figure 1 highlights the driving forces behind the redistribution of assets leased.15
Individual demand for assets of an agent with wealth w′ under law p2(·) is given
as γ2(pi,w
′ < w¯) and depicted in the left graph of figure 1. Weakening liability law
shifts demand downward to γ1(pi,w
′). In contrast, demand of rich enough agents is
15Note that figure 1 depicts the continuous limit of our results and abstracts from minor issues
that arise due to the discreteness of project scale.
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Figure 1: Impact of changing liability law on poor and rich agents.
unaffected and given as γ(pi,w ≥ w¯) under either law. As a result, aggregate demand
D2 shifts downward to D1 (right graph of figure 1). A reduction in aggregate demand
leads to a reduction of the profit rate from pi2 to pi1. Now, individual equilibrium
demand for assets is affected differently for rich and poor agents. For rich agents,
equilibrium demand increases from γ∗2 to γ
∗
1 which is due to the reduced profit rate.
However, for poor agents demand decreases from γ′2 to γ
′
1 because the partial equi-
librium impact of weakening liability law overrules the general equilibrium effect of
lower profit rates.
These results are in line with empirical evidence found by Gropp, Scholz and
White (1997).16 Consistent with proposition 8 part c, Gropp et al. (1997, p. 238 table
16Our explanation differs from theirs, which is based on the insurance role of higher exemption
limits. This requires the implicit assumption that debt contracts are incomplete. Our theory applies
to complete contracts and risk-neutral borrowers. Note also that their categorization of ‘demand’
and ‘supply’ factors differs from ours, in our respective theoretical explanations. They classify among
supply factors the effect of a higher exemption limit that raises default risk and lowers the returns
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III) report that the amount of debt is decreasing in the exemption limit for poor
borrowers in the lowest two quartiles of the wealth distribution. The increase in debt
for the top 2 quartiles of wealth is consistent with Proposition 8. These differences are
significant and economically meaningful. Gropp et al. (1997, p. 242, table V) compare
the predicted value of debt for an observationally equivalent household living in two
hypothetic states with different exemption limits.17 If the household is ”poor” with
assets worth $47, 000, belonging to the second quartile of the wealth distribution, the
estimated debt holding is $28, 105 in a state with low exemption limit ($6000), which
decreases to $10, 551 if the same household lives in a state with a high exemption limit
($50, 000). These differences change their sign if the household is rich, with $150, 000
worth of assets belonging to the highest wealth quartile. The rich household has a
predicted debt of $36, 136 in the low exemption limit state which increases to $72, 076
in the high exemption limit state.
Gropp et al. (1997) find that ex ante (nominal) interest rates increase for poor
borrowers increase substantially. For example, going from a zero exemption limit state
to an unlimited exemption limit states increases interest rates for a borrower of the
lowest asset quartile by 5% while it slightly decreases the interest rate for a borrower
from the highest asset quartile (albeit in a statistically insignificant manner). The
latter finding is in line with our theoretical analysis. In order to solve the model, we
used standard contract theory techniques and limited attention to state-contingent,
renegotiation proof contracts. A more realistic set-up (which could be the direct mech-
anism that is actually being played to obtain the outcome of our indirect mechanism)
would consider a loan with an interest rate corresponding to the payments made in
the good state of the world. In case of failure (the bad state of the world), renego-
to lenders. We classify it as a demand factor, as it is incorporated in the calculation of A-optimal
contracts (i.e., it is internalized by borrower-lender coalitions when they negotiate loan contracts).
This difference is purely semantic, of course.
17They are doing the exercise for a family with a 45 year male head, $75, 000 yearly income, college
degree and varying financial wealth.
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tiation with the bank then leads to a downward adjustment of payments and hence
state contingent contracts. If we now take the payment in the good state of the world
as our measure of the interest rate, it becomes clear that absent any GE effects the
interest rate must increase due to an increase in exemption limits. With GE effects,
the implications on the interest rate are not so clear as there are two opposing effects.
The GE effect decreases the interest rate while the direct commitment effect increases
the interest rate.
Proposition 8 does not describe the impact of weakening bankruptcy law on any
given wealth-constrained borrower; it states a reduction in the scale of projects ag-
gregating across all wealth-constrained borrowers. A more detailed result is possible
if we impose the additional restriction that the bankruptcy law is weakened more for
poorer borrowers.18 Hence a relaxation which appears to be ‘progressive’ ex post ends
up having a ‘regressive’ impact ex ante.
Proposition 9 Consider a weakening of bankruptcy rule from p2(.) to p1(.) with the
property that p2(W ) ≥ p1(W ) for all W , and p2(W )− p1(W ) is nonincreasing in W .
Then there exists w˜ ≤ w¯(pi2; p2) such that the payoff, effort and project scale of all
borrowers with wealth above (resp. below) w˜ (weakly) increases (resp. decreases).
Proof of Proposition 9: By the previous Proposition we have pi1 ≤ pi2. Since equilib-
rium project scale is nondecreasing in w, the fact that p2(W )−p1(W ) is nonincreasing
implies that
γ(w; p2)[pi2 − pi1]− [p2(σ(w))− p1(σ(w))] (10)
is nondecreasing in w. Define w˜ to be the smallest w such that (10) is nonnegative.
Then weakening the bankruptcy law to p1 causes constraint (F) to be relaxed at
the A-optimal contract under p2 for any w > w˜, and strengthened otherwise. Using
arguments analogous to those in previous results, it follows that project scale, effort
18This condition is however not met when bankruptcy laws take the form of exemption limits:
when the exemption limit is raised the bankruptcy law is weakened more for wealthier borrowers.
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and payoff of agents will rise (weakly) above w˜ and fall otherwise. From Proposition
8 we know that those above w¯(pi2; p2) are better off, so it must be the case that
w˜ ≤ w¯(pi2; p2).
5 Fixed Project Size
We now consider the special case where the returns to scale diminish fast enough
that project scale is at most one for any borrower. This is a special case of our model
where β is sufficiently small.19
Fixing project scale restricts the scope of asset reallocations across borrowers: it
is no longer possible for wealthy borrowers to borrow more when bankruptcy laws are
eased. Nevertheless, this case is of practical interest in many situations: e.g., tenant
households rarely want to rent more than one apartment, and taxicab drivers can
rarely drive more than one taxi. In such contexts, we can obtain some additional
results concerning the optimal shape of bankruptcy law, and more detailed distribu-
tional and incentive effects of changing the law.
We first show that the widespread practice of using asset exemption limits as the
form of bankruptcy law can be provided a normative justification in the fixed project
setting.
Proposition 10 For any allocation that is Walrasian under an initial law p(·) with
operating profit rate pi per asset, there exists a profit preserving exemption limit E∗
in the following sense. Under exemption limit law p˜(W ) = max{W − E∗, 0} there is
a Walrasian allocation with the same operating profit rate pi per asset as under the
19When β = 0, this is obviously true: there are no returns at all to increasing project scale beyond
one unit. It is also true in a positive neighborhood of 0. Such a neighborhood can be found by
imposing the requirement that the first-best project scale at pi = 0 equals one. Since A-optimal
project scales are nonincreasing in the profit rate, and bounded above by the first-best scale, the
A-optimal scale for every agent at any nonnegative profit rate will be 0 or 1.
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Walrasian allocation of the initial law p(·).
Consider a change in the bankruptcy law from the initial p(·) to the corresponding
profit preserving exemption limit law p˜(W ) = max{W −E∗, 0}. Then the following is
true.
1. Suppose β is small enough that the first-best project size is at most one. Then,
any initial bankruptcy law is (weakly) Pareto-dominated by its profit preserving
exemption limit law: every borrower is weakly better off.
2. There exists w˜ such that the payoff, effort and project scale of all borrowers with
wealth above (resp. below) w˜ (weakly) increases (resp. decreases).
Proof. Existence of a profit preserving exemption limit can be shown with the follow-
ing arguments. Consider first an exemption limit E = 0 which is the most stringent
feasible bankruptcy law. By Lemma 7 we know that γ(pi,wi, p(·)) ≥ γ(pi2, wi, p2) be-
cause for exemption limit E = 0 we have p(W ) = max{W − 0, 0} = W ≥ p(·) where
the last inequality is due to feasibility. So it must be the case that
∑
i γ(pi2, wi, p1) ≥ S
for any set of A-optimal project choices with E = 0. Next, consider a large enough
exemption with E¯ = σ(w1); this is the weakest possible bankruptcy law in our setting
since Lemma 1 implies d = wi and hence p(W ) = max{W − σ(w1), 0} = 0 ≤ p(·)
for all agents. By Lemma 7 we know that γ(pi,wi, p(·)) ≤ γ(pi2, wi, p2). Finally, for
every agent i the Walrasian demand is stepwise decreasing in E. As a result we can
find some intermediate value E∗ ∈ [0, E¯] with a market clearing Walrasian allocation
corresponding to profit rate pi.
Part 1: Let n be the poorest matched agent in the Walrasian allocation under
law p(·) with operating profit rate pi per asset and contracts (vis, vif , ei, γi) for all i.
From Lemma 5 it follows that all richer agents are also matched: γi = 1 for all i ≤ n.
Choose E∗ = σ(wn)− p(σ(wn)).
For every agent i ≤ n the set of contracts obeying constraint (F) increases due
to a change from p(·) to E∗ if pi is constant. In contrast, for every agent i ≥ n, the
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set of contracts obeying (F) shrinks. This is true due to the corresponding change in
σ− p(σ) as depicted in Figure 2 where σ∗ = σn for the first part of the proposition.20
Construct a new Walrasian allocation as follows, with the same profit rate pi.
Borrowers with i ≥ n do not demand any project. Those with i ≤ n demand one
project, and are assigned an A-optimal contract corresponding to profit rate pi and
exemption limit law E∗. The same principals are active. This is a Walrasian allocation
as long as the assigned project scales are A-optimal for every agent.
For an agent with i ≥ n, zero is an A-optimal project scale, because (F) has
become tighter for them. For i ≤ n, (F) has become more relaxed. See Figure 2.
Therefore by Lemma 7, their A-optimal project scale cannot decrease (as the profit
rate is the same). The A-optimal project scale for them was one previously, so it must
continue to be one. Therefore the constructed allocation is Walrasian.
Note finally that agents with i ≥ n are as well off as before. Those with i ≤ n
with wealth high enough to attain the first-best will also be left unaffected. Others
will be better off, as (F) was binding to start with, and has been relaxed.
Part 2
Constraint (F) of the A-optimal contract in the Walrasian allocation (and conse-
quently the Walrasian allocation) is unaffected for an agent with ex-ante wealth w if
σ(w)−p(·) = max{σ(w)−E∗, 0} and we consider the richest unaffected agent w˜. Note
that it must be true that max{σ(w˜)−E∗, 0} = σ(w˜)−E∗. This follows from the fact
that σ(w)−p(·)−max{σ(w)−E∗, 0} is inverse U-shaped and (weakly) increasing in w
until σ(w) = E∗. For wealth level with σ(w) > E∗, σ(w)−p(·)−max{σ(w)−E∗, 0} is
decreasing in w. Due to the inverse U-shaped nature of σ(w)−p(·)−max{σ(w)−E∗, 0}
it must be that the largest unaffected agent has wealth w˜ > E∗. Otherwise, all agents
with w < w∗ would be unaffected and Walrasian A-optimal demand for agents with
wealth w ≥ w˜ would increase. This is a contradiction to market clearing. From this
20Note that σ − p(σ) is increasing and below the 45 degree line for the class of liability laws we
consider here.
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Figure 2: Replacing p(·) with exemption limit law E∗
it follows that constraint (F) is less binding for all agents with wealth above w˜ and
more binding or unaffected for agents with wealth w < w˜. Using almost identical
arguments as in proposition 9 implies that utility, effort and project scale must be
weakly increasing. A graphical illustration of these arguments is given in figure 2
where σ(w˜) = σ∗ in the second part of the proposition.
Figure 2 conveys the underlying idea: fixing the exemption limit to equal the
liability limit of the marginal agent active in the market ensures that liability is
raised for excluded agents, and lowered for intramarginal active agents. Then the
demand pattern is unaffected: excluded agents continue to demand no project, while
intramarginal agents demand a single project. Hence there is an equilibrium with the
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same profit rate and the same allocation of projects; active agents can now commit
credibly to higher repayments in time of distress and obtain credit on easier terms as
a result. The logic does not extend if project scales could exceed unity: intramarginal
agents may then demand more projects, creating excess demand and raising the profit
rate. This may cause some marginal agents to get excluded from the market, so a
Pareto improvement no longer results. However, as shown in part 2 of proposition 10
in the case of variable project scale, replacing any bankruptcy law p(·) with a profit
preserving exemption limit is beneficial to rich borrowers.
The case of fixed project scale also permits a more detailed description of the
distributional impact of weakening bankruptcy law, if we further assume that all
principals are identical, i.e., have the same overhead cost f . Let the bankruptcy law
be represented by exemption limit E. An agent is viable at the exemption limit
E if there exists a contract for that agent feasible with this bankruptcy law, that
generates an operating profit of at least f . Let n(E) denote the number of viable
agents at exemption limit E; this is a nonincreasing function by virtue of Lemma 7.
Walrasian allocations can be computed as follows. Without loss of generality,
equilibrium pi must be at least f .21 Compute the A-optimal demand for each viable
agent when pi = f and the exemption limit is E. If the resulting aggregate A-optimal
demand exceeds m, the number of principals, the Walrasian allocation must involve
pi > f . In that case all principals will be active, and some viable agents will be
excluded from the market. In this case, the principals are on the short-side of the
market.
Conversely, if aggregate A-optimal demand at pi = f and exemption limit E does
not exceed m, there will be a Walrasian allocation at pi = f , where all viable agents
are matched and some principals are not. This is the case where the agents are on
the short-side of the market.
21If pi < f no principal nor agent will be active; an equivalent allocation with no activity is
obtained with pi = f .
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Now suppose the exemption limit is raised from E to E ′. There are three cases to
consider:
(A) Principals are on the short side of the market at both E and E ′: Then there
is no effect on the total volume of leasing or credit; the allocation of credit
across agents remains unaltered, but the profit rate falls or remains unchanged
(since the A-optimal demand for every agent falls or remains unchanged as the
exemption limit rises, at any given profit rate). Then every active agent is better
off, while every active principal is worse off. The result is a redistribution from
active principals to active agents. Moreover, it can be shown that wealthier
active agents benefit more, while the effort level declines (weakly) for all active
agents.22 The intuitive reason is that the beneficial GE effect applies equally to
all active agents, while the adverse PE effect of a higher exemption limit is less
significant for wealthier agents. Nevertheless the former outweighs the latter for
all active agents, not just the wealthiest ones.
(B) Agents are on the short side of the market both before and after the change: Then
the equilibrium profit rate is unchanged (at f); there is no GE effect. All agents
are (weakly) worse off, owing to the strengthening of the no-default constraint.
Principals are unaffected, so the result is a Pareto-deterioration of welfare.
(C) Principals are on the short-side at E but on the long-side at E ′: Then the profit
rate drops from pi(E) > f to pi(E ′) = f ; the number of assets leased falls, and
the poorest agents active at E get excluded from the market at E ′. On the
other hand, the wealthiest agents are better off owing to the drop in the profit
rate. In this case the weakening of the bankruptcy law makes lenders and poor
borrowers worse off, while wealthy borrowers are better off. It can be shown
22This implies that aggregate welfare, the sum of net payoffs across all principals and agents,
decreases (weakly). This result is shown in an earlier version of this paper, available on request.
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that the effort level declines or remains constant for all borrowers that continue
to be active. In this case, aggregate welfare also declines.
6 Effects of Means-Tested Exemption Limits
In this section, we discuss a simple variation of the model that helps predict the
impact of the current change in US bankruptcy law undertaken in the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005. We focus on
one particular aspect of BAPCPA: the abolition of free choice between chapter 7 and
chapter 13.
Prior to the change in the US bankruptcy law defaulting borrowers were free to
choose between the Chapter 7 code and the Chapter 13 code in most instances. The
Chapter 7 code is a much weaker bankruptcy law which allows defaulting borrowers
to keep a large fraction of wealth and all of their future labor income. So prior to 2005,
most debtors filed under chapter 7 (approximately 70% of all households, according
to White (1987)).
Following BAPCPA, households are only allowed to file under Chapter 7 if they
pass a means test, effectively requiring that their ex post income during the 6 month
prior to filing does not exceed the median (household size adjusted) income of the
state the debtor is living in (White (2007)). If the income exceeds this threshold, the
household is not allowed to file for bankruptcy under chapter 7 unless it passes a
second test, the repayment test which checks whether average consumption prior to
filing exceeds a certain threshold. If it does, the household must file under Chapter 13.
If average consumption prior to filing does not exceed the threshold, the household
may file under Chapter 7 if a certain requirement relating disposable income to secured
debt is met.
In what follows we will use the following simple interpretation of US bankruptcy
law before and after BAPCPA to understand the impact of the new law, especially
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the means test used in BAPCPA. First, we only consider the impact of the means
test under BAPCPA, assuming that the procedures under Chapter 7 and Chapter 13
codes are unchanged.23
Second, we exaggerate the attractiveness of Chapter 7 vs. Chapter 13 from the
standpoint of defaulting borrowers: what we call Chapter 7 will always be more at-
tractive to defaulting borrowers ex post.24 Alternatively we restrict attention to the
majority of borrowers for whom Chapter 7 is more attractive.
The law before the change is depicted in figure (3). Ex post, Chapter 7 is more
attractive to defaulting borrowers than Chapter 13 since the corresponding σ − p(σ)
curve under Chapter 7 is always above the one corresponding to Chapter 13. In
contrast, the law after BAPCPA is depicted in figure (4). Note that post BAPCPA
law violates our earlier assumption that W − p(W ) must be non-decreasing since
W − p(W ) makes a jump downward at σT . Here, σT corresponds to the threshold
value used in the means test. In what follows we will assume that agents cannot reduce
their ex post wealth to seek protection under Chapter 7. We expect our arguments to
be valid even if we allow for such opportunistic behavior as long as reducing ex post
income is costly.
Due to the discrete number of projects, Walrasian allocations need not be unique.
In what follows, if there exist multiple Walrasian allocations, we assume that the
23Actually there are two additional important changes in bankruptcy law due to BAPCPA. First,
the administrative procedure for filing under both, Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 has become more
complex, rendering either bankruptcy procedure less attractive to defaulting borrowers. Further,
Chapter 13 has been made less attractive since certain kinds of debt can no longer be discharged,
mainly debt obtained by fraud.
24This is true for at least 70% of defaulting borrowers prior to BAPCPA as White (1987) reports
that 70% of defaulting borrowers opted to default under Chapter 7. The remaining 30% defaulting
borrowers either prefer Chapter 13 over Chapter 7 (this is in particular the case if their house is
under the risk of foreclosure) or they are not allowed to file under Chapter 7. Under repeated default,
borrowers are no longer allowed to choose between chapter 13 and chapter 7 prior to BAPCPA.
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Walrasian allocation with the highest profit rate is realized.25
Proposition 11 Consider a change of bankruptcy law as described above, and re-
strict attention to the Walrasian allocation with the maximal profit rate pi (across all
Walrasian allocations at any given bankruptcy law). Then:
1. all agents with wealth σ < σT are weakly worse off due to the change. Agents
with wealth σ ≥ σT may be better or worse off and all principals benefit from
the change.
2. the total number of assets leased by agents with σ < σT will decrease (or remain
the same).
The argument follows from an inspection of Figures 3 and 4. Prior to BAPCPA,
there was a uniform bankruptcy law for all agents, represented by Chapter 7. Due to
BAPCPA, agents with σ ≥ σT have a potentially beneficial partial equilibrium effect
since their σ − p(σ) curve is shifted downwards. These rich agents are effectively
able to post a greater fraction of their ex post wealth as collateral. This leads to a
(weak) increase in their A-optimal demand. For agents with σ < σT , the A-optimal
demand patterns are unaltered. Hence the aggregate A-optimal demand curve shifts
outwards, raising the equilibrium profit rate. This renders principals (weakly) better
off. Whether or not agents with σ ≥ σT benefit depends upon the interaction of
partial and general equilibrium effect which is not clear in general. However, for
agents whose ex post wealth is below the threshold σT , the effect is clear. There is
no beneficial partial equilibrium effect and the (weak) increase in equilibrium profits
will render these poor agents worse off. Due to Lemma 6, the allocation of credit to
these agents must fall.
25We conjecture that the results hold for other rules, for example all allocations with minimal
profits or allocations with profits that are a weighted average of minimal and maximal profits.
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7 Conclusion
To summarize our principal result, weakening bankruptcy law leads to a redistribution
of credit and/or assets from poor to rich borrowers. This explains the findings of
cross-sectional analysis employing differences across US state bankruptcy provisions
(Gropp, Scholz and White (1997), Cerqueiro and Penas (2014)), as well as across
Indian states (Lillienfeld-Toal, Mookherjee and Visaria (2012)). Hence the effects
emphasized in this paper appear to be quantitatively significant.
Our model neglected dynamic effects of altering bankruptcy rules or collateriz-
ability of assets on savings incentives of agents, and on the ownership distribution
of assets in future periods. Enlarging the range of collateralizable assets may allow
increased access to credit in the short run, but subsequently renders borrowers more
vulnerable to downturns in the economy. Investigation of such dynamic effects remains
an important task for future research.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose there is contract which satisfies (5), and the agent
defaults following outcome k. Then j ∈ Ci receives skj, instead of tkj, the transfer in
the event that the agent does not default. Now the earlier contract can be replaced
with one where t˜kj = skj. This is feasible because
∑
j∈Ci t˜kj =
∑
j∈Ci skj = γ
βyk ≤
γβyk + wi − d+ σ(wi) the ex post wealth of the agent, as wi − d ≥ 0, σ(wi) ≥ 0. The
agent will not default under this new contract as∑
j∈Ci
t˜kj =
∑
j∈Ci
skj = γ
βyk ≤ γβyk + p(wi − d+ σ(wi)). (11)
And each principal j ∈ Ci earns the same payoff as before when default occurs, while
the agent avoids the penalty associated with default. So the new contract ex post
Pareto-dominates the previous one, which is thus vulnerable to renegotiation. This
establishes (i).
For (ii), note that if d < wi, the downpayment d can be raised by some  > 0, with
a corresponding reduction of
∑
j∈Ci tkj and of
∑
j∈Ci Ij by . In the new contract the
agent will also not want to default, as the mandated transfers fall by , while default
penalty p(wi−d+σ(wi)) falls by at most  (because the slope of p(.) is between 0 and
1). Then the agent’s payoff, as well as that of every j ∈ Ci, in state k is unaltered.
This new contract is then payoff-equivalent to the previous one.
To show (iii), fix d = wi, then re-allocate transfers and contributions across j ∈ Ci
in such a way to leave their expected payoffs unchanged. The aggregate financial
transfers vis-a-vis the agent remain unaltered, so do the agent’s incentives and payoffs.
Specifically, let pij denote the expected operating profit of j, which must cover the
overhead cost fj (otherwise j would do better to leave the coalition):
pij ≡ etsj + (1− e)tfj − Ij ≥ fj (12)
Let Π ≡ ∑j∈Ci pij ≥ ∑j∈Ci fj denote aggregate operating profit. If Π > 0, define
δj ≡ pijΠ and select I˜j = δj
∑
l∈Ci Il; t˜kj = δj
∑
l∈Ci tkl. Then the payoff of j equals
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p˜ij = δjΠ = pij. If Π = 0, then we have Ij = etsj + (1 − e)tfj for all j ∈ Ci: select
arbitrary δj ≥ 0 with
∑
j∈Ci δj = 1 and repeat the above construction. This completes
the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof of Lemma 2: Since i is viable, there exists a feasible contract (vs, vf , e, γ)
for some coalition Ci including i. Let δ ≡ (wl + σ(wl))− (wi + σ(wi)) > 0. For agent
l we can select a coalition Cl consisting of l and the same principals j that belong to
Ci. Then select the following contract: vˆs = vs + δ, vˆf = vf + δ, combined with the
same e and γ. By construction this contract satisfies (IC), (PCP) and (PCA). It also
satisfies (LL): the increase in the left-hand-side of (LL) is δ, while the increase in the
right-hand-side of (LL) is [σ(wl)−σ(wi)]− [p(σ(wl))−p(σ(wi))] ≤ σ(wl)−σ(wi) < δ.
Proof of Proposition 3: We proceed through a sequence of steps.
Step 1.1: A Walrasian allocation is stable. If not, there will exist an agent i that
deviates with a coalition Cˆi and a contract (vˆs, vˆf , eˆ, γˆ) which generates an expected
utility larger than that in the A-optimal contract relative to pi, and an expected
operating profit for every j ∈ Cˆi that exceeds pi. This contradicts the definition of an
A-optimal contract.
Step 1.2: In any stable allocation, all active principals attain the same (expected)
operating profit. If this is false, there exist two active principals j,m with pij > pim,
pij ≥ fj, pim ≥ fm. Let ji ∈ Ci. Then i can form a coalition with Cˆi ≡ Ci \ {j} ∪ {m}.
Let ni denote the number of principals in Ci, and select any  ∈ (0, pij−pimni+1 ). We can
then select a contract for the deviating coalition which increases vs, vf by , and also
increases pih by  for every h ∈ Cˆi. This contract is feasible and makes everyone in
the deviating coalition better off.
Step 1.3: In any stable allocation, pi ≥ fj for every active principal. If not, such a
principal would be better off unmatched.
Step 1.4: In any stable allocation, pi ≤ fj for any unmatched principal. Otherwise,
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an unmatched principal j could make positive net profit by being matched with an
active agent at the going profit rate of pi. An argument analogous to Step 1.2 can now
be used to show the allocation is not stable.
Step 1.5: In any stable allocation, every agent gets an A-optimal contract relative
to pi, the common rate of operating profit earned by active principals. Otherwise, there
exists a feasible contract for i which generates a higher expected payoff to i, while
paying an operating profit rate of at least pi on each asset leased. We now argue there
exists a contract in the neighborhood of this deviating contract which awards a profit
rate greater than pi for every asset leased, while still enabling the agent to attain a
higher expected payoff compared with that in the stable allocation.
The original contract satisfied (PCA), so the deviating contract satisfied (PCA)
with slack. We can thus ignore this aspect of feasibility in what follows.
If (LL) is slack in both states in the deviating contract, we can reduce vs, vf by
some common but small , which preserves feasibility. In this case the argument is
straightforward.
So consider the case where (LL) binds in some state. This must be state f , because
vs > vf is needed to induce e > 0, which in turn is necessary for feasibility ((PCP)
requires the project to break-even in expectation, and this is not possible if e = 0 given
that yf < I). So we must have vf = σ(wi)−p(σ(wi)). Now holding vf fixed at this level,
consider varying vs above vf , with e adjusted according to the (IC): i.e., with e = e(vs)
that solves vs−{σ(wi)−p(σ(wi))} = D′(e). Let the corresponding aggregate profit for
asset owners be denoted Π(vs) ≡ e(vs)[γβys−vs]+(1−e(vs))[γβyf−{σ(wi)−p(σ(wi))}],
where γ is the project scale in the deviating contract.
Define the P-optimal contract to be one where vs is selected to maximize Π(vs),
subject to vs ≥ σ(wi)− p(σ(wi)). This problem can be restated as follows (replacing
e as the control variable): select e ∈ [0, 1] to maximize e · [γβ(ys−yf )−D′(e)]. Noting
that eD′(e) is strictly convex, the objective function is strictly concave, and thus has
a unique solution. It is also evident that e > 0 in the P-optimal contract.
45
We claim that in the original contract (in the stable allocation), the agent must
have attained a utility at least as large as in the P-optimal contract. Otherwise, the
agent obtained a smaller payoff, and the contract in the stable allocation was not P-
optimal (as the P-optimal contract is unique, as shown above). So aggregate operating
profit of the principals in Ci must be less than the profit in the P-optimal contract.
Then the agent and principals in Ci could deviate to the P-optimal contract, which
would make all of them strictly better off.
Since the agent received a higher payoff in the deviating contract compared with
the contract in the stable allocation, it follows that the agent’s payoff in the deviat-
ing contract is strictly higher than in the P-optimal contract. In both the deviating
contract and in the P-optimal contract, we have vf = σ(wi)− p(σ(wi)), so they must
differ in vs, with the deviating contract associated with a higher vs. It follows that
as vs is lowered from that in the deviating contract to the level in the P-optimal
contract, the agent’s payoff is (continuously) lowered while aggregate profit of the
principals in Ci is (continuously) raised (owing to the strict concavity of aggregate
profit with respect to e). Therefore we can find a contract with vs slightly below that
in the deviating contract, which will allow a strictly higher aggregate profit, and a
slightly lower payoff for the agent. This allows all members of Ci as well as i to be
better off compared to the stable allocation, a contradiction. This completes the proof
of Step 1.5.
The proof of Proposition 3 now follows from combining Steps 1.1–1.5 to infer that
a stable allocation must be Walrasian.
Proof of Lemma 4: Define S∗(pi) ≡ γ∗βR(e∗)− e∗D′(e∗)−γ∗(I+pi), where we drop
the dependence of the first-best contract on pi to avoid notational clutter. Then if
S∗(pi) ≥ −p(σ(0)), the first-best satisfies (F) for all w ≥ 0, so we can set w¯(pi) = 0
in that case. Otherwise S∗(pi) < −p(σ(0)) and there exists w¯(pi) > 0 such that
S∗(pi) = −w− p(σ(w)), since −w− p(σ(w)) is decreasing in w and goes to −∞ as w
becomes arbitrarily large. Then the first-best is attainable with profit rate pi if and
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only if w ≥ w¯(pi), which establishes (a).
(b) Suppose there exist pi1 < pi2, wealth w and choices of first-best contracts such
that γ2 = γ
∗(pi2, w) > γ1 = γ∗(pi1, w). Then
γβ1R(e1)−D(e1)− γ1(I + pi1) ≥ γβ2R(e2)−D(e2)− γ2(I + pi1)
and
γβ2R(e2)−D(e2)− γ2(I + pi2) ≥ γβ1R(e1)−D(e1)− γ1(I + pi2)
where em denotes e
∗(pim, w),m = 1, 2. Adding these two inequalities we obtain
(γ2 − γ1)(I + pi1) ≥ [γβ2R(e2)−D(e2)]− [γβ1R(e1)−D(e1)] ≥ (γ2 − γ1)(I + pi2)
which contradicts the hypothesis that γ2 > γ1, as pi1 < pi2. Hence, γ
∗(pi,w) is non-
increasing in pi. This in turn implies e∗(pi,w) is nonincreasing because it maximizes
γ∗βR(e)−D(e).
In order to establish (c), note the following.
Observation 3.1: In any A-optimal contract, γ(pi,w) maximizes γβR(e(pi,w))− γ(I +
pi). Otherwise we can select a different γ to raise the value of γβR(e(pi,w))−γ(I+pi):
this both raises the value of the objective function (AO), and helps relax the constraint
(F).
Observation 3.2: In any first-best contract, γ∗(pi) maximizes γβR(e∗(pi)) − γ(I + pi).
Otherwise the value of the first-best objective function can be raised by switching to
a different γ, while leaving e∗(pi) unchanged.
We now claim that if w < w¯(pi), then e(pi,w) < e∗(pi) for any selection of second-
best and first-best contracts. If this is false, we can find contracts with e(pi,w) ≥ e∗(pi).
Using Observations 3.1 and 3.2, it follows that corresponding second-best and first-
best project scales satisfy γ(pi,w) ≥ γ∗(pi).
The hypothesis w < w¯(pi) implies that the first-best cannot be achieved by w at
profit rate pi. This means that (γ∗(pi), e∗(pi)) violates (F), while by its very nature
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(γ(pi,w), e(pi,w)) satisfies (F). This implies that
[γ(pi,w)]βR(e(pi,w))− e(pi,w)D′(e(pi,w))− γ(pi,w)(I + pi)
> [γ∗(pi)]βR(e∗(pi))− e∗(pi)D′(e∗(pi))− γ∗(pi)(I + pi)
which in turn implies
{[γ(pi,w)]βR(e(pi,w))− γ(pi,w)(I + pi)} − {[γ∗(pi)]βR(e∗(pi))− γ∗(pi)(I + pi)}
> e(pi,w)D′(e(pi,w))− e∗(pi)D′(e∗(pi))
> D(e(pi,w))−D(e∗pi))
the last inequality following from the fact that ∂eD
′(e)
∂e
= eD′′(e) + D′(e) > D′(e).
Then it must be the case that the second-best choices yield a higher utility than the
first-best choice, which contradicts the definition of the first-best.
Therefore every second-best effort must always be less than any first-best effort.
The rest of (c) now follows from Observations 3.1 and 3.2.
Proof of Lemma 5: Suppose there exist A-optimal efforts em ≡ e(pi,wm),m = 1, 2
such that e1 > e2. Then by Observation 3.1 corresponding A-optimal scales satisfy
γ1 ≥ γ2.
Since wm < w¯(pi), the first-best is not achievable at (pi,wm),m = 1, 2 and con-
straint (F) must be binding at (γm, em) for wm. Since w2 > w1, the contract (γ1, e1)
must satisfy (F) with slack at (pi,w2). To see this, note that
[γ2]
βR(e2) −e2D′(e2)− γ2(I + pi)
= −w2 − p(σ(w2))
< −w1 − p(σ(w1))
= [γ1]
βR(e1)− e1D′(e1)− γ1(I + pi).
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This implies that
{[γ1]βR(e1)− γ1(I + pi)} −{[γ2]βR(e2)− γ2(I + pi)}
≥ e1D′(e1)− e2D′(e2)
> D(e1)−D(e2)
the last inequality following from the hypothesis that e1 > e2. This implies that the
contract (γ1, e1) generates a higher payoff than (γ2, e2), contradicting the A-optimality
of the latter, since the former is feasible at the wealth w2. Hence e1 ≤ e2. The
remaining part of the result follows from Observation 3.1.
Proof of Lemma 6: The argument is virtually identical to that of Lemma 5 above,
in the case that the first-best is not achievable in either situation. And if the first-best
is achievable in either or both situations, we can use Lemma 4.
Proof of Lemma 7: Suppose the first-best payoff is achievable at (pi,w) under rule
p1; then it is achievable under p2 and the A-optimal payoffs coincide. So suppose that
the first-best is not achievable at (pi,w) under rule p1. If the first-best is achieved at
(pi,w) under rule p2 then the result follows from Lemma 4. So we need to consider
the case where the first-best is not achieved under either rule p1 or p2.
Let el denote an A-optimal effort under rule pl. An argument analogous to that
used in preceding Lemmas shows that e1 ≤ e2, which in turn implies that γ1 ≤ γ2.
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